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A BRIEF SURVEY OF DECONSTRUCTION
Pierre Schlag*
INTRODUCTION
A brief recollection of Derridean deconstruction (as if in a dream):
The dangerous supplement
Differance
The absence of the Transcendental Signified




A brief description of the background-normal view of positive law
operative among American legal professionals (as if in an ALI
restatement):
§ 214 Law
Law is principally what courts say it is. Or to put it conversely: By
and large, it is law if the courts have announced it as such.
Courts construct law from artifactual forms known as doctrines,
rules, policies, principles, opinions and holdings-all of which can
be moderately modified by reference to each other in approved ways.
Judges interpret these artifactual forms to produce a normatively
right result. Sometimes the judges succeed. Sometimes they fail.
Unless the result is normatively very, very wrong, what the judges
say is law.
Law is limited in scope and substance by realpolitick considerations
(e.g., the expenditure of the court's capital) and the identity of
* Pierre Schlag is Associate Dean of Research and Byron R. White Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado. For comments and criticisms, I wish to thank Sarah Krakoff and Bert
Westbrook.
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judicial personnel (e.g., the Rehnquist Court).
In certain situations (particularly in constitutional law or in other
subject matters residing in the vicinity of the grundnorm) it is
permissible to appeal to natural law-like considerations, but only
sparingly.
Law is relatively determinate at the core/center, but there is some
uncertainty/vagueness/indeterminacy at the periphery/penumbra. In
the latter cases, it is politics, good judgment, common sense,
realpolitick, etc. that help produce a decision.1
Given the juxtaposition above, it would be a wonder if
deconstruction had ever had anything of value to say to the champions
of positive law. The projects of deconstruction and positive law, as
juxtaposed above, seem so starkly different, so obviously askew to each
other, as to preempt any significant encounter-beyond perhaps an
immediate reciprocal repulsion.
And yet in various regions of the American legal academy-
regions not quite free of the gestures of positive law, yet not entirely
beholden to positive law either-some attempts at negotiation did
occur. That is what I will focus on here. I want to suggest that some
important things were learned in these encounters. Deconstruction, of
course, never made much headway in the American legal academy. It
was at most an irritant. And yet in the effort to neutralize this irritant,
American legal thought revealed itself-its structure, its fundamental
operations. It was not pretty, but it was illuminating.
2
Not only were the aesthetics of deconstruction and positive law
discordant, but the gestures of deconstruction were utterly askew to the
practice of legal thought in the American legal academy. One major
problem for the advent of deconstruction in law was a function of
deconstruction's apparent lack of any transparent normative or political
content. American legal thought was relentlessly normative in
character. The pi&e de resistance in legal scholarship-the law review
article-was a display of advocacy (modeled more or less loosely on
appellate argument) and aimed at prescribing some rule, method,
theory, or the like to a judge or a judge-surrogate. The end-line of this
prototypical artifact was, "And therefore the court should, or we should
I This is a very crude vision of law. Few (if any) legal professionals would describe their
view of law in this way. But there is a big difference between what one describes as one's view
of law and the view of law one actually deploys when one is ostensibly doing legal exegesis. The
former, not surprisingly, tends to be far prettier, far more sophisticated and coherent than the
latter. Here I am more interested in the latter. For elaboration, see Pierre Schlag, Ten Thousand
Cases Maybe More-An Essay on Centrism in Legal Education, 3 AGORA (2002),
http://agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume2/schlag.shtml.
2 See Peter Goodrich, Pierre the Anomalist: An Epistemology of the Legal Closet, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 791 (2003).
[Vol. 27:2
2005] BRIEF SURVEY OF DECONSTRUCTION 743
or somebody should.. .."
Not all law review articles were normative in this literal sense. As
with all prototypes, there were significant departures or variations-
attempts by legal scholars to provide descriptive accounts, to do history
or sociology or the like. But even then, the question haunting such
efforts was still: What should the court do; what should we do? The
fact of the matter is that the practice of American legal thought was
relentlessly normative.
Moreover, even in the case of interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary
work, the rhetoric of legal thinkers continued to be ruled by the
essentially norm-focused rhetoric of the appellate brief. When legal
thinkers did "theory" they tended to do it as an appellate advocate might
do theory. To be sure, the nature of the citations changed-from U.S.
Reports to "Philosophical Investigations"-but the rhetoric (not to
mention the blue book symbols) remained much the same.
The advent of deconstruction in the legal academy thus required a
certain negotiation with the settled practice of normative legal thought.
Some of the negotiations displayed a certain self-awareness of the
difficulties and some clearly did not. Over all, it's safe to say that most
legal academics who thought at all about deconstruction received it in
such a way as to leave their own normative and political commitments
intact-indeed, unquestioned. How this happened is the rest of the
story.
1. CLS AND DECONSTRUCTION
It was thinkers associated with Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") who
played the major role in introducing deconstruction to law.3 Much of
CLS scholarship had been, following Duncan Kennedy's example,
structuralist in character. Much early CLS work charted the recurrence
of certain "contradictions" (rules vs. standards, altruism vs.
individualism, public vs. private, etc.) within various discrete local
regions of positive law.
Given Derrida's well-known deconstruction of structuralism, 4 the
background for the introduction of deconstruction had already been
3 See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1277, 1277-96 (1984); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151
(1985); David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985). Later came
Jack Balkin, who wrote an article explaining deconstruction to legal academics. See J. M. Balkin,
Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Pierre Schlag, Cannibal
Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988).
4 JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278 (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
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established. Moreover, the challenge posed by deconstruction to the
very idea of law made deconstruction appealing to the anti-legalist
strand of CLS thinkers. Then, too, a number of the new entrants into
the legal academy had been trained in poststructuralism during their
undergraduate educations. The advent of deconstruction in American
legal thought was thus, as we used to say, overdetermined.
In much of the CLS literature, deconstruction was transposed into
the already well-honed rhetorical space of critical analysis. 5
Deconstructive moves were used as a way to reveal the lack of
coherence and conceptual integrity of doctrinal fields. 6 Deconstruction
used in this way tended to be highly conceptualist in character-
engaging doctrine at its own highly formalistic level. This effort was a
product of a deliberate choice among many CLS thinkers to engage
doctrine and doctrinal argument on their own turf.
Doctrine was engaged at a formalistic level in the sense that CLS
thinkers deployed deconstruction on law in the books, not law in action.
Hence, the texts subjected to deconstruction were, by and large,
appellate judicial opinions, legal doctrine, the ALl Restatements,
normative doctrinal scholarship, and normative legal theory. 7  As
critical analysis of this corpus juris, deconstruction was used to reveal
the terms suppressed by legal discourse; to recover the suppressed terms
and to re-introduce them into the discourse. Deconstruction was used as
a kind of ground-clearing exercise. Leftist political commitments
though, were generally left intact-beyond the reach of deconstruction.
The deployment of deconstruction, of course, could not itself
furnish any argument as to the political content of norms or ideals. This
realization led to the perception of a kind of schismatic or disjunctive
quality to CLS deconstructive work: the deconstructive tendency did not
self-evidently conduce in any clear way to the CLS advocacy of leftist
politics. The connection between the two required an ungrounded
existentialist leap of faith. Some critics of CLS took this to be a fatal
problem for critical thought (almost always without any supporting
argument). Meanwhile, some CLS thinkers readily acknowledged,
indeed affirmed, the aporia. Admittedly, it was occasionally odd to see
someone engaged in deconstruction of an aspect of law and then,
suddenly, jump ship and advocate for his or her preferred norm in all its
5 In one sense, deconstruction is not critical analysis at all. It is instead a type of interpretive
practice or activity used to show how texts produce their meaning. When, however, this
interpretive practice or activity reveals conceptual or rhetorical operations that do not conform to
the regulative ideals of the genre (a genre like law, for instance) then deconstruction also emerges
as critical analysis.
6 See Frug, supra note 3; Dalton, supra note 3; Peller supra note 3.
7 These canonical texts were generally read by CLS thinkers as a typical law professor might
read them (as propositional truth-claims about law) rather than as a lawyer might read them (as
tools for the strategic behavior: leveraging, coercing, threatening, inducing and so on).
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logocentric grandeur. It was particularly bizarre as seen from the
perspective of deconstruction. The deconstructionist, after all, was
letting loose an unlimited infrastructural critique. To borrow a
metaphor from Duncan Kennedy, deconstruction was "viral." There
was no internal reason for the epidemic to stop.
Nonetheless, the CLS thinkers did attempt to stop the play of
deconstruction. They attempted to stop the play, precisely at the point
where the deconstruction had reconceptualized the field so as to enable
the advocacy of a preferred political prescription. In this, the CLS
thinkers followed a familiar pattern in American legal thought-one in
which a critique is launched and then artificially arrested at precisely the
point where the rhetorical terrain has been reconfigured to enable the
articulation of a positive normative program. 8 The realists did this.
CLS did it too. The Federalists do it still.
In all candor, it is very hard (impossible?) not to do this at some
point. Nietzsche warns of what lies at the end of the line:
Imagine the most extreme example, a person who did not possess the
power of forgetting at all, who would be condemned to see
everywhere a coming into being. Such a person.., sees everything
in moving points flowing out of each other, and loses himself in this
stream of becoming. He will, like the true pupil of Heraclitus, finally
hardly dare any more to lift his finger.
9
If it were possible for deconstruction to go on forever, it certainly
wouldn't be very appealing. But then again, going on forever in this
way is not really an option. As one of my friends put it, sometimes we
have to break for lunch.
The real risk, I think, is that the deconstruction is terminated too
soon. And in this respect, one can certainly fault American legal
thinkers for being too hesitant, too fearful, in pursuing deconstruction
wherever it might have led. Deconstruction was, from the very start,
offered too small and too miserly a field of play.
II. THE NON-ENGAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL ACADEMY
As an intellectual matter, the legal academy's response to Derrida
and deconstruction was a study in dismissiveness and non-engagement.
If one looks back at the mainstream legal literature addressing
deconstruction in the 80s and 90s, the question is not so much whether
the mainstream critics of deconstruction read Derrida well, but whether
they read him at all.
8 Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1627, 1729-30 (1991).
9 FRIEDERICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE (Adrian Collins
trans., 2d ed. 1957).
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Whatever the answer to that question, Derrida did excite some
professional anxiety. Even if he wasn't read by the mainstream critics,
many of them obviously felt some compunction to dismiss him and his
followers.
Why?
My best guess is this: "Deconstruction" was understood or
misunderstood to be whatever it was CLS thinkers did. In turn, what
CLS thinkers did was threatening to the legal academy because it
rendered mainstream legal scholarship an essentially meaningless
enterprise.
To appreciate the point, one must think about CLS themes not
jurisprudentially, but instead psychologically-that is to say, in terms of
what the CLS themes portended for the career of a mainstream legal
thinker. To say, as CLS thinkers did, that law was "indeterminate" was
to say that the arguments of mainstream legal scholars were essentially
gratuitous. To say that law was "incoherent" or "contradictory" was to
say that law was not really an academic discipline fit for the university.
And to say that law was politics-perhaps the most cutting claim of
all-was in effect to render the mainstream legal thinker's self-
abnegation before the edifice of an objective law a transparently
ridiculous gesture.
All of this could have been played out as comedy or satire. Only it
didn't. And to understand why, we must imagine the mainstream legal
thinker in his office, slowly and painstakingly sifting through endless
judicial opinions, exercising magisterial self-restraint, carefully
marshalling arguments in favor of some modest legal proposition. All
that effort. All that sober work. And if the CLS themes are right-all
for nothing.
III. DECONSTRUCTION AS TOOLKIT
Another way of negotiating the reciprocal repulsion of positive law
and deconstruction was to frame deconstruction as a technique, a
method, an analytical instrument for the lawyer's toolkit. Jack Balkin
was pre-eminent in this framing of deconstruction. 10 In one sense, this
was a genial way to render deconstruction useful to the academic
elaboration of positive law. Since deconstruction had no normative
agenda and since law was supposed to be "neutral," why not consider
deconstruction a kind of all purpose reasoning tool, ready for use to
anyone? In this view, deconstruction would need (just like other forms
10 See Balkin, supra note 3, at 743-44, 764-67. As Balkin put it, "[d]econstruction by its very
nature is an analytic tool." Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 27:2
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of legal reasoning) a supplemental normative orientation to give it
direction. And this normative supplement would be furnished by the
normative projects of the legal thinker.
This was a plausible strategy-though problematic in a few ways.
First was the obvious fact that to treat deconstruction as a tool,
technique, method, etc., flew in the face of Derrida's expressed views.
As Derrida stated, deconstruction allows
for (no) method: no path leads around in a circle toward a first step,
nor proceeds from the simple to the complex, nor leads from a
beginning to an end .... We here note a point/lack of method...:
this does not rule out a certain marching order."I
Or more bluntly: "Deconstruction as such is reducible to neither a
method nor an analysis (the reduction to simple elements).' 2 And
understandably so: to accord deconstruction the status of a tool,
technique, or method would be to encase and subordinate
deconstruction within a logocentric architecture. In law, to treat
deconstruction as a tool would in effect subordinate deconstruction to
some normative project chosen by an autonomous individual subject
with all the usual attendant metaphysical presuppositions. It would
relegate deconstruction to the choices of an autonomous individual
subject who could use it for any and all normative ends. This, of
course, would be contrary to Derrida's express views:
[Deconstruction is an] incision, precisely [because] it can be made
only according to lines of force and forces of rupture that are
localizable in the discourse to be deconstructed. The topical and
technical determination of the most necessary sites and operators-
beginnings, holds, levers, etc.-in a given situation depends upon an
historical analysis. This analysis is made in the general movement
of the field, and is never exhausted by the conscious calculation of a
"subject". ... 13
Whether or not Balkin's reading of Derrida was plausible or right
is not really the main issue here. Nor, ironically, was it the main issue
in my earlier piece-where I argued that Balkin's understanding of
Derrida was mistaken and symptomatic of the stereotypical operations
of the dominant form of American legal thought. 14 That Balkin might
have misunderstood Derrida was not (and is not) interesting in and of
itself. Indeed, why should we care? What was interesting, as I saw it, is
that Jack misunderstood Derrida in a way that was deeply stereotypical
11 JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 271 (Barbara Johnson trans., 1981).
12 JACQUES DERRIDA, The Almost Nothing of the Unpresentable, in PoINTs... INTERVIEWS,
1974-94, at 78, 83 (Elisabeth Weber ed., Peggy Kamuf trans., 1995).
13 JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 82 (Alan Bass trans., 1981) (third and fifth emphasis
added).
14 Pierre Schlag, "Le hors de texte, c'est moi ": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOzO L. REV. 1631 (1990).
2005]
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
of the practice of American legal thought. The interesting thing, then, is
not that Jack might have had Derrida wrong, but rather that the way he
got Derrida wrong so aptly revealed the stereotyped infrastructure and
operations of American academic legal thought. For me, it was a kind
of afortiori moment. Here was this practice (deconstruction) that was
implacably resistant and antagonistic to norm advocacy and here was
this legal thinker (Jack) who unselfconsciously read this practice as a
technique, a tool, for norm advocacy. If this could happen-and Jack
was a smart guy-then what we had afortiori was a truly remarkable
and powerful professional ideological practice in place. It was that
practice-normative legal thought-I then set out to explore and
describe. 15
I also argued against Balkin's interpretation because at the time, it
seemed to me that his reading of Derrida could help to shut down
deconstruction. As I saw it, deconstruction offered an entry into a more
radical interrogation of the practice of American legal thought. But
Balkin's approach helped to reprieve legal thinkers, progressives and
liberals from encountering this more corrosive deconstruction. And
many American legal thinkers were only too happy to land upon some
account of deconstruction that enabled them to avoid such a radical
interrogation.
This was unfortunate, not only for the prospects of deconstruction
(whatever those prospects might have been). It was unfortunate as well
for liberals and progressives. Indeed, it is conceivable that if liberals
and progressives in the legal academy had been less hostile and more
intellectually serious in their encounters with Derrida and
postmodernism generally, they might have developed a more salient
understanding of our postmodern legal/political situation. But it didn't
15 Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN L. REv. 167 (1990). I set out to
explore this practice quite conscious of the fact that I was situated within the practice. I could
easily have claimed to be "outside" this practice-a kind of freestanding observer exempt from
the shortcomings of the practice I was diagnosing. But that would have been silly: a cheap
rhetorical trick (albeit one that is terribly common in law review scholarship). I wanted to
explore the practice of normative legal thought from the inside as it were. So I situated myself
quite consciously within the practice of normative legal thought (although hardly as a paradigm
case).
Jack Balkin, among others, seized on this to describe my work on normative legal thought
as contradictory or paradoxical as if somehow, this were sufficient to impugn its merits or
contributions But Jack has yet to make the argument that my work is indeed contradictory or
paradoxical in any interesting sense. (If I say that I both love and hate English, this is hardly a
problematic contradiction.) And Jack has yet to show that the contradictions or paradoxes are
fatal-that is to say, that something really, really bad for me or my work follows from any of this.
Among the choices available to Jack here would be to say (1) that my work is unintelligible (but I
don't think Jack believes that), (2) that my work is dishonest and disingenous (but I am nothing if
not straightfoward about what I am doing), (3) that my work fails to comply with commonly
accepted disciplinary forms and protocols (yes, and this is news?), and/or (4) that my work is
wrong (and here I'd like to see the argument).
[Vol. 27:2
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happen.
In the end, Balkin's reading of deconstruction as toolkit helped
produce an arrested deconstruction. It left the practices of American
legal thinkers-their habits, orientations, procedures, protocols, etc.-
intact. By confining deconstruction to the rhetorical space of "an
analytical tool" this vision did not even preserve the tension between
deconstruction and positive law-which the CLS thinkers had, in some
measure, maintained as a live problem.
IV. HEEDING THE CALL OF THE OTHER
Yet another negotiation between deconstruction and the enterprise
of positive law was facilitated by Derrida himself. This we could call
"the later Derrida" and it seems to me that whatever value the later
Derrida might have had in the other humanities (we all have different
protocols) it was of very little value in the American legal academy.
At the conference at the Cardozo School of Law in 1989, Derrida
proclaimed that "[d]econstruction is justice."' 6 Like deconstruction,
"U]ustice is an experience of the impossible.' i7 It is the call of a certain
ethical and political relation to "the other"-one that cannot ever fully
be realized in law or laws, one whose demands always exceed any
reduction to law and laws.
This vision was championed by Drucilla Cornell who wrote:
Deconstruction keeps open the "beyond" of currently unimaginable
transformative possibilities precisely in the name of Justice. And so,
we are left, as I have argued, with a command, "be just with Justice,"
and an infinite responsibility to which we can never close our eyes or
ears through an appeal to what "is".... 18
Heeding the call of the other-being open to the other-is a
responsibility that is in one sense consonant with the early Derrida-
that is, with deconstruction. Inasmuch as deconstruction exposes the
"suppressions" of the text by which the text attempts to establish its
meaning, it allows the retrieval of the excluded, marginalized aspects of
the text. If one transposes this sort of gesture to the ethical or political
plane, it is easy to see that deconstruction would warrant a certain
solicitude for the suppressed other whose voice and views are excluded
from the text of positive law. 19
16 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority ", 11 CARDOzO L.
REv. 919, 945 (1990).
17 Id. at 947.
18 DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 182-83 (1992).
19 See, e.g., Peter Goodrich, Europe in America: Grammatology, Legal Studies and the
Politics of Transmission, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 2033, 2040 (2001) (likening Derrida's intervention
at Cardozo in 1990 to Of Grammatology).
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This vision of justice as being open to the other was for a time
congenial to identity politics. The "other" in this context was
understood to refer explicitly to the usual client groups-persons of
color, women, gays, etc. Ironically, however, this reduction of the other
to a starkly limited set of reified social identities along lines of race,
gender and sexual orientation threatened to neutralize openness to the
other "others"-those who fell through the cracks, those who registered
in different categorial planes, those simply left off the list. In an ironic
turn-around, an enterprise aimed at retrieving a suppressed other
suddenly turned into a rigid delimitation of the other to a few stark
socio-political reifications.
In one sense, such a delimitation was readily understandable. If
being open to the "other" did not refer primarily to certain stereotyped
social identities, a different problem arose: the other became rather
indefinite. Being open to the other is no doubt an elegant, albeit
somewhat precious, idea-as far as it goes. But to urge this as some
sort of meaningful program for those engaged in the enterprise of
positive law is at once trivial and problematic. Positive law (such as we
know it) has a vigorous drive for closure-for decision, for
categorization, for ordering and so on. And positive law is precisely the
enterprise that undertakes the task of deciding how much to be open to
the other and which kinds of others to be open to (women, Jehovah's
witnesses, Subchapter S corporations, the disenfranchised, Donald
Trump, etc.).
So, in the context of law, the injunction to be "open to the other"
turns out to mean something quite different from what it might initially
have seemed. What it means is something like this: Be open to the
other in a way that is also closed to the other. In other words, it doesn't
mean much of anything at all. As Stanley Fish might say, it is advice
one cannot fail to heed. Indeed, one cannot help but be open to the
other (in some ways) as well as closed to the other (in other ways).
Now, it is conceivable that, in a specific context, the notion of
being open to the other might mean something. For instance, after an
altercation between two friends, you might counsel one of them to be
more "open to the other." But here the character of the altercation and
the identity of the two friends give meaning to the phrase. After all, you
could have said something entirely different such as "Hey, he really
does owe you an apology." Or "just wait, time will help." Or "I don't
think you two should talk. about this anymore." But to offer up the
notion that one should be "open to the other" in general, as a kind of
universal advice, is not only meaningless; it is the sort of thing that
cannot possibly help. It is simply a re-enactment of the intractable
tolerance-intolerance dialectic: One should be tolerant of others except
to the extent that they are the kind of others to which one should be
[Vol. 27:2
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intolerant, and so on and so forth.
Moreover, being open to the other frames the problem in terms of a
self-other relation. But for those engaged in the enterprise of positive
law, the problem usually takes on a triadic form. The question is how
one should relate to two different and opposed, or even antagonistic,
others. This triadic form is hardly unique to law, but one can say that in
positive law, this triadic problematic is at once frequent and intense.
Given the highly constrained adversarial character of adjudication and
its insistence on closure (i.e., a result), being open to an other almost
always entails being closed to another other.
Being "open to the other" in law does not and cannot mean very
much. On the one hand, as a formula (which Derrida surely did not
intend) the notion is virtually empty. Not only is it nearly empty, but
the very enterprise of positive law contradicts this injunction. A
positive law without closure would not only be infernal-think of the
ALI as "being open to the other"-but it would not be law.20 Moreover,
one cannot become open to the other simply by giving one's self
general normative instructions.
CONCLUSION
All these efforts in the American legal academy to negotiate the
relations of deconstruction to law and positive law were problematic.
Deconstruction was received in the legal academy within a well
entrenched institutionalized practice that fashioned legal thought as a
kind of normative advocacy deployed by relatively autonomous
individual subjects engaged in the enterprises of norm-selection and
norm-justification. Nothing, so far as I can tell, has displaced the
centrality and dominance of that practice-not deconstruction, not
postmodemism, not inter- or trans- disciplinarity, not cultural studies.
As a psycho-social matter, the resilience of normative legal
thought in the American law school is entirely predictable. Its
continued vitality is, as we use to say, overdetermined.
Existentially, however, the continuation of the practice remains
puzzling. Let's be candid here: normative legal thought may well be
difficult to do. And it may be especially difficult to do well. But it is
still of no great intellectual value. And it remains aesthetically
compromised. And at least for progressives and liberals (which is to
say, the vast majority of legal academics) the practice remains
politically and normatively ineffectual.
20 At least not as most of us presently understand law. Note that I am not being a semantic
imperialist here, but merely making a contingent empirical presumption about how most of us
understand positive law.
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So at the existential level, joining with this practice remains
puzzling. Why do this? One person once answered me, laughing
nervously: "Because, it's what we do. It's our job." But that's not true:
it's not your job unless you make it so.
